Rico on the High Seas: A Symposium on Civil Rico and Maritime Law: Civil Rico\u27s Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima by Abrams, Douglas E.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
Fall 1987
Rico on the High Seas: A Symposium on Civil Rico
and Maritime Law: Civil Rico's Cause of Action:
The Landscape After Sedima
Douglas E. Abrams
University of Missouri School of Law, abramsd@missouri.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Douglas E. Abrams, Civil Rico's Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 Tul. Mar. L.J. 19 (1987)
CIVIL RICO's CAUSE OF ACTION: THE
LANDSCAPE AFTER SEDIMA
Douglas E. Abrams*
I. Introduction ................................... 19
II. Civil RICO's "Treasure Hunt" ......................... 25
A. Section 1964(c): Injury to Plaintiff's Business or
Property ........................................... 25
B. Section 1962: The Enterprise ................... 30
1. The Section 1962 Enterprise Relationships: May
the Enterprise Be a Defendant? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
a) Section 1962(a) ............................. 32
b) Section 1962(b)..., ......................... 33
c) Section 1962(c) ............................. 34
d) Section 1962(d) ............................. 37
2. Must the Enterprise Be Distinct From the
Pattern of Racketeering Activity? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
C. Section 1961: The Pattern of Racketeering Activity
41
1. Racketeering Activity .......................... 41
2. "Pattern" of Racketeering Activity ............. 44
III. C onclusion ............................................. 51
I. INTRODUCTION
In maritime fraud actions, lawyers recently have begun to recog-
nize the potential breadth of "civil RICO," the private cause of action
created by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).' To the uninitiated, RICO's name might suggest that the
private cause of action reaches only racketeers and other organized-
crime defendants. If civil RICO indeed reached no further, it would
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1973, Wesleyan
University; J.D. 1976, Columbia University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the help of his research assistant, Catherine DiDomenico of Fordham's class of
1989, and faculty secretary Mary L. Whelan.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This paper reflects the law on May 5,
1987, the date of the paper's delivery at the Maritime RICO symposium. In preparing the
paper for publication, however, the author has added commentary concerning four subsequent
Supreme Court decisions that bear on civil RICO litigation.
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merit only passing attention from most members of the maritime bar.
Developments since RICO's 1970 enactment, however, have laid
firmly to rest any suggestion of limited reach. As Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. observed, civil RICO "has been interpreted so broadly that
it has been used more often against respected businesses with no ties
to organized crime, than against the mobsters who were the clearly
intended targets of the statute. ' 2
An understanding of the nascent civil RICO litigation "explosion"
begins with recognition that RICO operates against conduct, not sta-
tus. In the effort to enact effective anti-racketeering legislation in
1970, Congress declined to prohibit membership in organized crime
or in identifiable organized-crime groups. Not only did the
lawmakers recognize that proving organized-crime membership had
traditionally been difficult and often impossible; they also concluded
that an express organized-crime prohibition might have led courts to
strike down RICO for creating an unconstitutional status offense.
Congress sought to reach racketeering not by legislating against rack-
eteers directly, but by legislating against the conduct in which racke-
teers were thought to engage. Because Congress sought to cast a wide
net, RICO operates against some conduct, particularly fraudulent
conduct, that is engaged in by racketeer and nonracketeer defendants
alike.
More than any other private cause of action enacted by Congress in
the past generation, civil RICO has been plagued by unanticipated
consequences. In 1967, the Katzenbach Commission urged Congress
and the states to "make a full-scale commitment to destroy the power
of organized-crime groups."3 Congress responded in 1970 with the
Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA),4 which included RICO as
Title IX. RICO authorizes the government to move against defend-
6ants in criminal prosecutions,' civil proceedings, or both. RICO's
private cause of action, referred to by most courts and commentators
as "civil RICO," authorizes plaintiffs to sue and recover treble dam-
2. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 526 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
3. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200 (1967). For a discussion of
RICO's origins, see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982).
4. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended in various sections of 18, 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
[Vol. 12
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ages and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees.'
As the names "Organized Crime Control Act" and "Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" themselves indicate, Con-
gress' concern was the threat posed by organized crime and racketeer-
ing. The OCCA's purpose was "to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States ... by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime." 8 According to the Senate Report, RICO's purpose
was to "eliminat[e] . . . the infiltration of organized crime and racke-
teering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce."
During hearings on the OCCA bill, a few witnesses advised the
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee that RICO's broad
proscriptions might reach some nonracketeers. 10 Some lawmakers
repeated this warning during debate on the bill," but Congress was
willing to accept the prospect of occasional nonracketeer defendants
in the effort to strike at organized crime.
Civil RICO went virtually unnoticed for nearly a decade, largely
because RICO is codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, whose
pages plaintiffs' lawyers ordinarily do not turn in search of private
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982), quoted in relevant part infra text accompanying note 33.
8. Pub. L. No. 91-452, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
Congress found that:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified,
and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption;
(2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the
theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and
other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money
and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and
labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized
crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's
economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations,
interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of
the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow . . .
because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
Iti at 922-23.
9. S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Report].
10. See, e.g., Abrams, The Place of Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue or Be
Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretation From Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REv.
1477, 1522-23 (1985).
11. See id. at 1523-24.
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remedies. By late 1981, however, plaintiffs had begun to discover not
only civil RICO's existence, but also its potential breadth. 12 Of the
270 district court civil RICO decisions reported before 1985, forty
percent involved securities fraud and thirty-seven percent involved
common law fraud in a commercial or business setting. 13 Only nine
percent of these decisions involved "allegations of criminal activity of
a type generally associated with professional criminals."' 14 With the
prospect of recovering both treble damages and attorneys' fees, plain-
tiffs have continued tb invoke civil RICO against a host of nonrack-
eteers, including banks,15 lawyers or law firms,' 6 Big Eight accounting
firms, 17 insurance companies," securities investment firms,19 and col-
leges.2° Even the Ku Klux Klan21 and Church of Scientology 22 have
12. Of the 270 pre-1985 district court civil RICO decisions, 3% (nine cases) were decided
throughout the 1970's, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and
43% in 1984. See REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION
OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55 (1985) [hereinafter ABA Report], cited
in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 n.l (1985).
13. See ABA Report, supra note 12, at 55, cited in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16.
14. See ABA Report, supra note 12, at 56, cited in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16.
15. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985), aff'g
per curiam 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522 (9th
Cir. 1987); Atkinson v. Anardarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3276 (1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th
Cir. 1986); Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 657 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Tex.
1987).
16. See, e.g., Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1986); Butchers
Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986); Netelkos v. Weinberg,
[1987 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,219 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1987); Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); McMurtry v.
Brasfield, 654 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va. 1987); Penturelli v. Spector Cohen Gadon & Rosen,
640 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Pa. 1986). See also, e.g., Nordberg v. Lord, Day & Lord, 107 F.R.D.
692 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Crocker Nat'l Bank
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
17. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Says. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966
(11 th Cir. 1986); see also, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987);
Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1986); Moll v. US Life Title Ins.
Co., 654 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also, e.g., Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
19. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Hall v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 468 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1986); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten,
Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986); Forkin v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 804
F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1986); Felkner v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 800 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.
1986); Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1986); see also,
e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984).
20. See, e.g., Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, 656 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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been named as civil RICO defendants. Civil RICO claims have begun
to appear in actions alleging maritime fraud.23
In its 1985 decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,24 the
Supreme Court addressed civil RICO for the first time. Against the
background produced by the four-year civil RICO litigation explo-
sion, the Court raised few eyebrows with its observation that "RICO
is evolving into something quite different from the original conception
of its enactors."25 The Court encouraged continued evolution, not
only by rejecting limits that many lower courts had previously placed
on civil RICO, 26 but also by determining as a general proposition that
civil RICO's widespread use against nonracketeers is "inherent in the
statute as written. ' 27  Sedima concluded that Congress intended
RICO, including the private cause of action, "to be read broadly. 28
Current judicial trends indicate that RICO's breadth will enable
private plaintiffs to assert civil RICO claims in a large percentage of
actions sounding in fraud, no matter what the defendant's status or
other circumstance might be. Civil RICO seems destined to become a
staple of maritime fraud litigation, much as it has already become a
21. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198
(S.D. Tex. 1982).
22. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
23. See, e.g., Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn (ex Trade Endeavor), 813 F.2d 60 (5th
Cir. 1987) (action by purchaser, which had entered into a charter party agreement for
shipment of oil, against vessel in rem and shipper in personam seeking to recover damages for
alleged short delivery and contamination of the oil). Valero is discussed in 4 Lloyd's Maritime
Law 1-2 (N. Am. ed. May 15, 1987). See also, e.g., Brent Liquid Transport, Inc. v. GATX
Leasing Corp., 650 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (action for declaratory judgment
concerning the right to exercise options to purchase eight inland river tank barges under a
bareboat charter/lease agreement).
24. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). See also Sedima's companion decision, American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (per curiam). The Court more recently has had
the opportunity to interpret civil RICO in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987), and in Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332
(1987).
The Court has twice interpreted RICO in cases arising from criminal RICO convictions.
See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (profits and proceeds derived from
racketeering constitute an "interest" within the meaning of RICO and thus are subject to
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981)
(entirely illegitimate entity may be a RICO enterprise).
25. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
26. See infra notes 44-48, 64-67, 111-13 and accompanying text.
27. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
28. Id. at 497. As the Court had done in Turkette and Russello, Sedima grounded its broad
reading partly in Congress' express directive that RICO "shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970). See
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498; Russello, 464 U.S. at 27; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587.
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staple of private fraud litigation in other fields. Maritime counsel will
bring and defend private actions under RICO and the various state
"Little RICO" statutes that create private causes of action.29 Activity
will not necessarily be confined to the courtroom because the Supreme
Court recently held that predispute arbitration agreements, otherwise
enforceable in accordance with the terms of the Federal Arbitration
Act, apply to civil RICO claims.30
29. Twenty-seven states and Puerto Rico have enacted so-called "Little RICO" statutes
patterned on federal RICO. The "Little RICO" statutes vary in scope and application, but
nearly all create private causes of action. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2301 to 13-2317
(1978 and Supp. 1986) (treble damages); Cal. Penal Code §§ 186-186.8 (West Supp. 1987) (no
private cause of action); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-17-101 to 18-17-109 (1986) (treble
damages and injunctive relief); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-393 to 53-403 (West 1985 and
Supp. 1987) (no private cause of action); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, §§ 1501-11 (Michie Supp.
1986) (treble and punitive damages; injunctive relief); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 895.01-895.09 (West
Supp. 1987) (injunctive relief); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-14-1 to 16-14-15 (1984 and Supp. 1987)
(treble and punitive damages; injunctive relief); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 842-1 to 842-12 (1985
and Supp. 1986) (actual damages); Idaho Code §§ 18-7801 to 18-7805 (Supp. 1987) (treble
damages); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 56-1/2, 1651-1660 (Smith-Hurd 1985 and Supp. 1987)
(narcotics only; treble damages); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-45-6-1 to 35-45-6-2, 34-4-30.5-1 to 34-
4-30.5-5 (West 1983 and Supp. 1987) (treble and punitive damages; injunctive relief); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 15:1351-15:1356 (West Supp. 1987) (narcotics only; treble damages); Miss. Code
Ann. §§ 97-43-1 to 97-43-11 (Lawyers Co-op. Supp. 1986) (treble and punitive damages;
injunctive relief); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 207.350-207.520 (Michie 1986) (treble damages);
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:41-1 to 2C:41-6.2 (West 1982 and Supp. 1987) (same); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 30-42-1 to 30-42-6 (Michie Supp. 1987) (same); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 460.00-460.80
(McKinney Supp. 1987) (no private cause of action); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75D-1 to 75D-14
(Michie Supp. 1986) (treble damages); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to 12.1-06.1-08
(Smith Supp. 1987) (treble damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2923.31-2923.36 (1987) (treble
damages; injunctive relief); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.715-166.735 (1985) (treble and punitive
damages; injunctive relief); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 911 (Purdon 1983 and Supp. 1987) (no
private cause of action); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, §§ 971-97lp (1980 and Supp. 1986) (same);
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 7-15-1 to 7-15-11 (Michie 1985 and Supp. 1986) (treble damages); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 39-1-1001 to 39-1-1010 (Michie Supp. 1986) (no private cause of action); Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1601 to 76-10-1609 (Michie Supp. 1987) (double damages; injunctive
relief); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9A.82.001-9A.82.904 (West Supp. 1987) (actual damages);
Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 946.80-946.87 (West Supp. 1987) (double and punitive damages).
To the extent that a "Little RICO" statute authorizes courts to grant private plaintiffs
injunctive relief, the statute may provide greater relief than federal RICO provides. Most
courts reaching the question have concluded or suggested that injunctive relief is not available
to civil RICO plaintiffs. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d
1076, 1081-89 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987) (citing and discussing
decisions); Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc. v. Guerdon Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 951, 960-61
(D. Del. 1986) (holding that injunctive relief is not available to civil RICO plaintiffs).
30. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343-46 (1987). The
Federal Arbitration Act is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). By holding civil RICO claims
arbitrable, McMahon avoids the problems of bifurcation that otherwise would arise when
plaintiffs join arbitrable maritime claims with civil RICO claims. On the problems of
bifurcation generally, see Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 3 (1986).
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This paper analyzes the federal civil RICO cause of action.
Because civil RICO litigation remains a relatively recent develop-
ment, at each stage of the analysis the paper addresses the major
unresolved questions that remain in Sedima's wake.
II. CIVIL RICO's "TREASURE HUNT"
RICO is codified at 18 U.S.C. sections 1961 to 1968. To state a
civil RICO claim, the plaintiff must allege that it suffered (1) injury in
its business or property because the defendant, (2) while involved in
one or more enumerated relationships with an enterprise, (3) engaged
in a pattern of racketeering activity.3
A. Section 1964(c): Injury to Plaintiff's Business or Property
Civil RICO's "treasure hunt"32 begins with section 1964(c), which
provides that "[any person injured in his business or property by rea-
son of a violation of section 1962 ... may sue therefor in any appro-
priate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."'3 3 By providing that " 'person' includes any individual
31. The injury element is discussed infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text; the enterprise
element is discussed infra notes 53-106 and accompanying text; the pattern element is
discussed infra notes 107-49 and accompanying text.
Special venue and process provisions apply in civil RICO actions. Venue lies in any district
in which the defendant "resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1965(a) (1982). Process may be served "on any person in any judicial district in which such
person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (1982).
Once a defendant is served, the court, on a showing that "the ends of justice require that other
parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, . . . may cause such parties to
be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district .... " 18
U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1982).
32. See Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984) (RICO "is
constructed on the model of a treasure hunt.").
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Neither § 1964(c) nor any other RICO provision explicitly
establishes exclusive federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits arising under civil RICO.
Authority remains divided on the question whether civil RICO litigation is confined to the
federal courts. In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), the Supreme
Court reiterated the "general principle" that "state courts may assume subject-matter
jurisdiction over a federal cause of action absent provision by Congress to the contrary or
disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and state-court adjudication." Id. at 477-
78 (citations omitted).
Analysis thus "begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction."
Id. at 478. RICO does not explicitly rebut this presumption, but the presumption can be
rebutted by "unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by clear incompatibility
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests." Id. Factors indicating clear
incompatibility include "the desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal
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or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in prop-
judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal
claims." Id. at 483-84.
The majority of courts reaching the question have held that RICO implicitly establishes
exclusive federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits arising under civil RICO. RICO's
legislative history yields no indication that Congress ever considered this jurisdictional
question, but most of the majority decisions find in that history an "unmistakable implication"
of intent to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction. Congress patterned civil RICO on section 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), which the Supreme Court has held implicitly
establishes exclusive federal jurisdiction. Because the language of RICO's section 1964(c)
closely tracks that of section 4 of the Clayton Act, several majority decisions conclude that
Congress must have intended that actions under the former section be heard exclusively in the
federal courts. See, e.g., Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Wyo. 1986); Massey v.
City of Okla. City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Levinson v. American Accident
Reins. Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (Del. Ch. 1985); Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill.
App. 3d 712, 495 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Washington Courte Condominium
Assoc.-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 681, 690-91, 501 N.E.2d 1290, 1296-
97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Ambassador Office Equip., Inc. v. Gallagher, Nos. 84-2050, 84-2912
(Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 6, 1986) (LEXIS, States Library, Ill. file); Maplewood Bank & Trust Co. v.
Acorn, Inc., 207 N.J. Super. 590, 591 & n.2, 504 A.2d 819, 820-21 & n.2. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1985); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 473, 489
N.Y.S.2d 502, 504-05 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space
Constructors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 305, 306-07 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Several majority decisions find "clear incompatibility" between state-court jurisdiction and a
federal interest in facilitating uniform nationwide civil RICO interpretation and enforcement
by federal judges who hold expertise in issues raised in RICO actions. See, e.g., Spence, 647 F.
Supp. at 1270; Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd.-1981A, 604 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (E.D.
Wash. 1985); Levinson, 503 A.2d at 635; Washington Courte, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 501
N.E.2d at 1297; Maplewood Bank, 504 A.2d at 821, 207 N.J. Super. at 591; Greenview Trading
Co., 108 A.D.2d at 468, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 505-06.
On the other hand, decisions finding concurrent civil RICO subject-matter jurisdiction
stress that Congress could have, but did not, explicitly establish exclusive federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Carman v. First Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp. 862, 864 (W.D. Ky. 1986); Chas. Kurz Co.
v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 381 n. 1I (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("When Congress wants jurisdiction
to be exclusive it can so provide."); Luebke v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460, 1462
(E.D. Wis. 1983). In the absence of explicit congressional mandate, some courts find civil
RICO's Clayton Act pedigree insufficient to establish an "unmistakable implication" of
congressional intent to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction. According to one court,
"[d]ouble and treble damages are common in both federal and state court and are totally
unrelated to the issue of jurisdiction." HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D.
Va. 1986); see also, e.g., County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 773 F.2d 892, 905 n.4 (7th Cir.
1985) (expressing "doubt whether the analogy to antitrust law is sufficiently strong to conclude
that because jurisdiction over antitrust cases is exclusively federal, RICO jurisdiction
necessarily must follow suit").
Some courts finding concurrent jurisdiction conclude that because exclusive jurisdiction
would deprive civil RICO plaintiffs of initial choice of forum, exclusive jurisdiction would be
inconsistent with Congress' directive that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes." See, e.g., Cianci v. Superior Court (Poppingo), 40 Cal. 3d 903, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375, 379 (1985) (referring to Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947 (1970)); see also, e.g., Village Improvement Ass'n v. Dow Chem. Co., 655 F. Supp. 311,
313 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Courts finding concurrent jurisdiction also do not perceive "clear incompatibility" between
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erty,''34 RICO creates a potentially broad plaintiff class. Civil RICO
claims have been asserted by such plaintiffs as individuals, 35 corpora-
tions, partnerships, governmental agencies and units,38  labor
unions,3 9 churches," universities,4' and estates.42
Courts have uniformly held that by authorizing suit on behalf of a
plaintiff "injured in his business or property," section 1964(c) pre-
cludes recovery for personal injury.43 Until Sedima, however, section
this jurisdiction and federal interests. One decision concludes that concurrent jurisdiction
would not thwart uniform interpretation because civil RICO is "sufficiently detailed in scope
and clear as to its purpose that the likelihood of future judicial gloss is comparatively limited."
Cianci, 710 P.2d at 381 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., HMK Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 717.
Some courts conclude that because RICO operates against conduct that constitutes state as
well as federal violations, federal judges hold no greater expertise than state judges in issues
raised in civil RICO actions; see, e.g., Cianci, 710 P.2d at 381; HMK Corp., 637 F. Supp. at
717. Finally, some courts conclude that because RICO operates against conduct that is
contrary to state and federal interests alike, no basis exists for concluding that federal courts
would be more hospitable than state courts to civil RICO claims; see, e.g., Cianci, 710 P.2d at
381.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
35. See, e.g., Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1987).
36. See, e.g., Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987).
37. See, e.g., Manax v. McNamara, No. W-87-CA-014 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Kings Square Partnership v. South Savs. & Loan Ass'n, No. 86-2534
(E.D. La. Apr. 16, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Meadow Ltd. Partnership v.
Heritage Says. and Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Va. 1986).
38. See, e.g., Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 314-17 (7th Cir. 1985);
Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984); City of N.Y. v.
Joseph L. Balkan, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 536, 541-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); State of N.Y. v. O'Hara,
652 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ill.
1986); County of Cook v. Lynch, 648 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Il1. 1986); Commonwealth of Pa. v.
Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Lake Asphalt
& Petroleum Co., 610 F. Supp. 885 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hardin,
608 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Cianfrani, 600 F. Supp. 1364
(E.D. Pa. 1985); State of Md. v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1980).
39. See, e.g., Butchers Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986).
40. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
41. See, e.g., Temple Univ. v. Salla Bros., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
42. See, e.g., Estate of Dearing v. Dearing, 646 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. W. Va. 1986).
43. See, e.g., Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1986); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985);
McMurtry v. Brasfield, 654 F. Supp. 1222, 1224-25 (E.D. Va. 1987); von Bulow v. von Bulow,
634 F. Supp. 1284, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 626 F. Supp. 365, 366-
67 (D. Mass. 1986); Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co., 615 F. Supp. 496, 501 (W.D. Wis. 1985);
Bast v. A.H. Robins Co., 616 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty
Co., 596 F. Supp. 988, 990-91 (D. N.J. 1984); Morrison v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 101
F.R.D. 743, 744, 746 (D.D.C. 1984). See also, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2764 (1987) (Section 1964(c) and section 4 of the Clayton Act "aim
to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff show injury 'in his business
or property by reason of' a violation."); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)
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1964(c) was a major battleground. In an apparent effort to restrict
civil RICO's potentially broad scope, many courts held that the sec-
tion conferred standing only on persons who alleged particular types
of injury in their business or property." Noting that the language of
section 1964(c) closely tracks that of section 4 of the Clayton Act,45
some courts required civil RICO plaintiffs to allege injury that placed
them at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. Noting that
RICO was conceived as anti-racketeering legislation, some courts
required allegation of "racketeering injury," which the Second Circuit
described as "injury caused by an activity which RICO was designed
to deter."4
6
Sedima struck down the competitive-injury and racketeering-injury
requirements as inconsistent with RICO's language and legislative
history. According to the Court, "[i]f the defendant engages in a
pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [section
1962(a)-(c)], and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his
business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c)."'48
Congress failed to address a critical threshold issue. RICO does
not provide an express statute of limitations for actions brought under
section 1964(c). By early 1987, lower courts had not adopted a con-
sistent approach to the problem of selecting the most appropriate stat-
("[T]he phrase 'business or property' [in section 4] . . . would . . . exclude personal injuries
suffered.").
44. See Abrams, supra note 10, at 1509-16.
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2764 ("Even a cursory
comparison of the two statutes reveals that [civil RICO] was patterned after the Clayton
Act.").
46. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479
(1985).
47. Concerning competitive injury, see Sedirna, 473 U.S. at 497 n. 1 (Civil RICO damages
"include, but are not limited to, . . . competitive injury."); concerning racketeering injury, see
id. at 493-500.
48. 473 U.S. at 495. In two subsequent decisions, the Court has indicated that where a civil
RICO plaintiff alleges injury to its business or property by reason of a section 1962 violation
based on acts of mail or wire fraud, the plaintiff must allege pecuniary injury or injury to
tangible or intangible property rights; allegation of injury to an intangible right does not
suffice. See McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), and Carpenter v. United States,
108 S. Ct. 316 (1987), both discussed infra note 108.
Several courts have concluded that by authorizing suit by "any person injured in his
business or property," section 1964(c) does not confer standing on corporate shareholders who
allege merely that the defendant's civil RICO violation injured the corporation; see, e.g., Rand
v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 579 (1986);
Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 542, 544 (6th Cir. 1985); Klapper v.
Commonwealth Realty Trust, 657 F. Supp. 948, 953 (D. Del. 1987); Gallagher v. Canon
U.S.A., Inc., 588 F. Supp. 108, 110-11 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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ute of limitations for civil RICO claims.49 In Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff& Assocs.50 in June of 1987, the Supreme Court resolved
the limitations imbroglio by holding that the four-year statute of limi-
tations applicable to Clayton Act civil enforcement actions5 applies
in civil RICO actions. Because the plaintiff Malley-Duff had filed its
complaint less than four years after the earliest time its civil RICO
action could have accrued, however, the Court did not determine the
appropriate time of accrual for civil RICO claims.5 2
49. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2763 (discussing lower court decisions). In
a pre-Agency Holding Corp. decision that grappled with the civil RICO limitations problem,
one judge offered these perceptive observations about the costs incurred whenever Congress
establishes a private cause of action but remains silent concerning the applicable statute of
limitations:
Fixing the statute of limitation for a particular cause of action is a legislative
function. Indeed, it is not a particularly difficult or complex legislative function.
In most circumstances, it can be handled in a sentence. Yet, in a significant
number of statutory schemes of nationwide application, Congress has failed to
fulfill this basic responsibility and has left the courts to spend hundreds of hours
- and thousands of dollars in government money - searching for a substitute
solution. Meanwhile, justice is delayed, not only in the cases in which limitation
issues arise but also in the many cases, often raising far more serious questions,
which must wait while this tedious process takes place.
Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted), vacated and remanded, 107 S.Ct. 3255 (1987), on remand, 826
F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1987).
The 1985 American Bar Association Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force had characterized the
lower courts' approach to the civil RICO limitations problem as "confused, inconsistent, ...
unpredictable... [and] virtually guaranteed to incite complex and expensive litigation over
what should be a straightforward matter." See ABA Report, supra note 12, at 391-92. For
general discussion of the inconsistent decisions that preceded Agency Holding Corp., see, e.g.,
Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil RICO Actions After Wilson v. Garcia, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 529 (1987); Lane, Civil RICO: A Call For a Uniform Statute of Limitations, 13 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 205 (1985).
50. 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
52. 107 S. Ct. at 2767. Lower courts remain divided on the question of when a civil RICO
claim accrues. Nearly all decisions reaching the question conclude that in accordance with the
general federal rule, a civil RICO claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of the injury that is the basis of the action. See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698,
725 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3266 (1987); Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co.,
783 F.2d 1011, 1015 (11th Cir. 1986); Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178
(Ilth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th
Cir. 1984); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 578 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Abernathy
v. Erickson, 657 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 653 F.
Supp. 1278, 1282 (D.V.I. 1987); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646
F. Supp. 1442, 1454 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bernard v. Rush, 641 F. Supp. 730, 733 (M.D. La.
1986); Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454, 1474, 1478 (D.N.J. 1986);
HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 723 (E.D. Va. 1986); Moore v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 138, 144 (E.D. La. 1986); A.J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v.
HeinOnline  -- 12 Tul. Mar. L.J.  29 1987
30 TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
B. Section 1962: The Enterprise
Section 1964(c) authorizes suit by plaintiffs who allege injury in
their business or property "by reason of a violation of section 1962."
The latter section53 makes it unlawful for "any person" to engage in a
"pattern of racketeering activity '5 4 while the person is involved in one
or more enumerated relationships with an "enterprise engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
55
Congress Fin. Corp., 611 F. Supp. 532, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 792 F.2d
330 (3d Cir. 1986); Electronics Relays (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F. Supp. 648, 654
(N.D. Ill. 1985); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 809 (D. Md. 1985); Clute v. Davenport
Co., 584 F. Supp. 1562, 1577 (D. Conn. 1984); Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp.
424, 427-28 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa.
1983). A few courts, however, have held that a civil RICO claim accrues when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury from the last act on which the plaintiff relies in
alleging defendant's pattern of racketeering activity; see, e.g., Moll v. US Life Title Ins. Co.,
654 F. Supp. 1012, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 648 F. Supp. 17,
36 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
53. Section 1962, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982), provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income,
in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity . . . to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Section 1962(a)-(c) operates not only against any person who engages in a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity, but also against any person who engages in "collection of an unlawful debt."
Nearly all civil RICO claims, however, are based on allegations of a pattern.
54. According to section 1961 (1), a person engages in "racketeering activity" by engaging in
any act "chargeable" under several generically described state criminal laws, any act
"indictable" under several specific federal criminal provisions including the mail and wire
fraud statutes, or any "offense" involving bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related
activities that is "punishable" under federal law; see infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
According to section 1961(5), a pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity" within ten years; see infra notes 117-49 and accompanying text. Most
civil RICO complaints allege a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of "predicate acts" of
mail fraud, wire fraud, or fraud in the sale of securities.
55. Courts are "well settled" that a RICO plaintiff alleges the required commerce nexus by
alleging that the enterprise had minimal engagement in, or that its activities had minimal effect
on, interstate or foreign commerce. United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir.
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RICO's definition of "person" creates a potentially broad defendant
class.5 6 Civil RICO claims have been asserted against such defend-
ants as individuals, 7 corporations,58 partnerships, 9 labor unions,6'
churches,6 colleges,62 and estates.63
Some pre-Sedima decisions held that although section 1962 oper-
ates against "any person," Congress intended to limit civil RICO's
defendant class to persons connected with organized crime. 64 Even
before Sedima, the organized-crime limit was rejected by all courts of
appeals and most district courts that had considered it.65 Sedima laid
the issue to rest. The Court acknowledged that civil RICO actions
"are being brought almost solely against [nonracketeer] defendants,
rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster"; 66 the Court
concluded, however, that this development has occurred because sec-
1985); see also, e.g., Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); R.A.G.S.
Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Rone, 598
F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub norn. Little v. United States, 445 U.S. 946
(1980)); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1288-89 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 781 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092
(1983); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
962 (1982); City of N.Y. v. Joseph L. Balkan, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 536, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1987);
D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 231 (M.D. Pa. 1982). For example, a RICO
enterprise's mere receipt, use or sale of any goods shipped in interstate or foreign commerce is
sufficient to establish the minimal nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Conn, 769 F.2d 420, 424
(7th Cir. 1985); Robinson, 763 F.2d at 781; United States v. Allen, 656 F.2d 964, 965 (4th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1980); Karel v.
Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Virden v. Graphics One, 623 F. Supp. 1417,
1431-32 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528,
1535 (W.D. Pa. 1984); United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 191 (S.D. W. Va. 1979).
RICO plaintiffs, however, must nonetheless exercise care in alleging the minimal nexus; see,
e.g., Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 579 F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (defendants' motion for
summary judgment granted because defendants' alleged intrastate use of telephone did not
constitute allegation that civil RICO enterprise had engaged in, or that its activities had
affected, interstate commerce).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 34.
57. See, e.g., Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1987).
58. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987).
59. See, e.g., Netelkos v. Weinberg, [1987 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,219
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1987).
60. See, e.g., Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95, 817 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1987).
61. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Robinson v. City Colleges, 656 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
63. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1982).
64. See Abrams, supra note 10, at 1516-19, 1521-24.
65. See id. at 1516 & nn. 193-95.
66. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
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tion 1962 operates against " 'any person' - not just mobsters. 67
The RICO "enterprise" may be either a legal entity or an associa-
tion-in-fact. To help assure that section 1962 reaches a broad range of
conduct, RICO provides that " 'enterprise' includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."6 In United States v. Turkette69 in 1981, the Supreme Court
held that even entirely illegitimate enterprises may be RICO
enterprises.
1. The Section 1962 Enterprise Relationships: May the Enterprise
Be a Defendant?
(a) Section 1962(a)
The first of section 1962's enumerated enterprise relationships is
found in subsection (a).7° This subsection makes it unlawful for any
person "who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise .... 1
The plaintiff alleged a section 1962(a) violation in Masi v. Ford City
Bank & Trust Co. 72 After the plaintiff Masi had opened an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA) by depositing $11,587.39 with the defend-
ant bank, Masi agreed to guarantee a loan made by the bank to a third
party for $19,452.96. Masi guaranteed repayment to the extent of
$10,000. When the third party defaulted on an unpaid balance of
nearly $13,000, the bank withdrew $11,208.31 from Masi's IRA to
satisfy the guaranty obligation and notified him of the withdrawal by
mailing him three letters.73 The civil RICO count alleged that the
withdrawn funds constituted "income" that the bank had "received
from" predicate acts of mail fraud and then had used "in operation
of" its own banking enterprise.
By naming the bank as both the defendant and the enterprise,
plaintiff Masi raised the troublesome "distinction" question: may the
67. Id. at 495.
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
69. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982), quoted in relevant part supra note 53.
71. Id.
72. 779 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 399, 401.
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RICO enterprise also be a defendant? The Seventh Circuit rejected
the bank's contention that, as a matter of law, the section 1962(a)
enterprise must be distinct from the defendant, or culpable "person."
The panel held that the section 1962(a) enterprise may also be a
defendant when the enterprise is "actually the direct or indirect bene-
ficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but not when it is merely
the victim, prize, or passive instrument of racketeering. '7 4 The panel
concluded that under "a literal reading of the statute,' 75 a person may
receive income from a pattern of racketeering activity and then "use
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the pro-
ceeds of such income" in its own operations.76
(b) Section 1962(b)
Section 1962(b) 77 makes it unlawful for any person, "through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity . . . to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise. .. "
The plaintiffs alleged a section 1962(b) violation in Medallion TV
Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV, Inc.71 Medallion and SelecTV entered
74. 779 F.2d at 401 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d
384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
75. Id. at 402.
76. Most decisions considering the distinction question have concluded that the section
1962(a) enterprise may also be a defendant. See, e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d
522, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1987); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,
1397-98 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[W]here a corporation engages in racketeering activities and is the
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, it can be both the 'person'
and the 'enterprise' under section 1962(a)."); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 977
(7th Cir. 1986); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986) ("The
language in section 1962(a) does not require a relationship between the person and the
enterprise... so it does not require the involvement of two separate entities."); Roche v. E. F.
Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 320-21 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty
Trust, 657 F. Supp. 948, 955-57 (D. Del. 1987); Vietnam Veterans Inc. v. Guerdon Indus.,
Inc., 644 F. Supp. 951, 956-57 (D. Del. 1986); Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec, Inc., 643 F.
Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Derry Constr. Corp., 617 F. Supp.
940, 943 (W.D. Pa. 1985) ("Logic dictates that a corporation, receiving income from a pattern
of racketeering in which it has participated as a principal, can invest that income in its own
operations."); B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Ref. Co., 617 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D. N.J. 1985) (on
remand). Decisions concluding that, as a matter of law, the section 1962(a) enterprise must be
distinct from the defendant include United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181,
1183, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); McMurtry v. Brasfield, 654 F.
Supp. 1222, 1226 (E.D. Va. 1987); Garbade v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 645 F.
Supp. 808, 811 & n.6 (D. Colo. 1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (RICO "was not intended to convict the infiltrated enterprise but the violator
of the predicate acts.").
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982), quoted in relevant part supra note 53.
78. 627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
1987]
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into a joint venture ("Medsel") to acquire and sell worldwide rights to
telecast the 1981 heavyweight bout between Muhammad Ali and
Trevor Berbick. Medsel subsequently acquired the worldwide telecast
rights from the bout's promoter. The joint venture agreement pro-
vided that SelecTV would attempt to sell telecast rights to pay and
cable television stations in the United States and Canada, and that
Medallion would attempt to sell telecast rights throughout the rest of
the world. Sales were disappointing, and both joint venturers suffered
losses. 7 9 The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendants, SelecTV
and three of its officers and directors, had fraudulently induced
Medallion to enter into the joint venture. The civil RICO claim
alleged that the four defendants had violated section 1962(b) by
acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of two enterprises
- SelecTV itself and Medsel - through predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property.
The court held that Medallion had properly alleged Medsel as an
enterprise. Reaching the distinction question, however, the court held
as a matter of law that the defendant SelecTV could not be an enter-
prise because Congress intended that the section 1962(b) enterprise be
"'different from ... the person whose behavior the act was designed
to prohibit.' "80
(c) Section 1962(c)
Most civil RICO claims allege a violation of section 1962(c), 81
79. Id. at 1292-93.
80. Id. at 1295 (quoting United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983)). For other decisions concluding that, as a
matter of law, the section 1962(b) enterprise must be distinct from the defendant, see, e.g.,
Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, 656 F. Supp. 555, 560-61 (N.D. Ill. 1987); HGN Corp.
v. Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Johnson & Williams, 642 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Bruss Co. v. Allnet Comm. Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. Il. 1985) (Section
1962(b)'s language "contemplates that the enterprise is the victim, not the perpetrator, of the
crime."). Decisions concluding that the section 1962(b) enterprise may also be a defendant
include Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 529-30; Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806
F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (Under section 1962(b), "the corporation necessarily must be
the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity to be both the 'person'
and the 'enterprise.' "); Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, 657 F. Supp. 948, 957 (D.
Del. 1987); Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc., 644 F. Supp. at 956-57; Commonwealth of Pa. v.
Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp. 940, 943-44 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), quoted in relevant part supra note 53. Of the 270 pre-1985
district court civil RICO decisions, 97% alleged violation of section 1962(c). See ABA
Report, supra note 12, at 57. Even counting the decisions in which violation of one or more of
the other subsections was alleged along with violation of section 1962(c), the other subsections
played a relatively minor role. Violations of section 1962(a), (b), and (d) were alleged in
approximately 9, 15, and 12 percent of the decisions respectively. Id.
[Vol. 12
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which makes it unlawful for any person "employed by or associated
with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity .... ,,82 Sedima itself concerned an alleged sec-
tion 1962(c) violation.83
In 1979, the plaintiff Sedima, S.P.R.L., a Belgian corporation,
entered into a joint venture with defendant Imrex Co. to provide elec-
tronic components to a Belgian firm. The buyer was to order parts
through Sedima; Imrex was to obtain the parts in the United States
and ship them to Europe. The agreement called for Sedima and
Imrex to split the net proceeds. Imrex filled roughly $8 million in
orders that were placed with it through Sedima. In 1982, Sedima filed
suit alleging that by presenting inflated bills, Imrex had cheated
Sedima out of a portion of its proceeds by collecting for nonexistent
expenses. Sedima alleged that the three defendants (Imrex and two of
its officers) were "employed by or associated with" an enterprise (the
joint venture)8 4 and had conducted or participated in the conduct of
82. Some courts have concluded that by operating against defendants who "conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of" an enterprise's affairs, section 1962(c)
requires allegation of the defendant's active involvement in those affairs. See, e.g., Bennett v.
Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (dictum), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983)
("A defendant's participation must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which
ordinarily will require some participation in the operation or management of the enterprise
itself."); Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1223 (D. Kan. 1986) (Section 1962(c)
violation "occurs only when the racketeering activity is being used as an integral part of the
management of the enterprise's affairs.").
Most courts considering the question, however, have rejected Bennett's dictum. See, e.g.,
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savs. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11 th Cir.
1986) (Contention that defendant must conduct or participate in the conduct of a RICO
enterprise "in a significant manner . . . ignores the 'directly or indirectly' language of
§ 1962(c)."); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1360 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002
(1983) (Section 1962(c) applies "to insiders and outsiders - those merely 'associated with' an
enterprise - who participate directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity .... [T]he RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest
fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise.") (emphasis in the original) (citations
omitted). A person conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity when the person "is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his
position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise; or
[when] the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise." United States v.
Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982) (quoting United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981)); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315,
318-19 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
83. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
84. See Amended Complaint 58, reprinted in Joint App. 18a.
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the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity con-
sisting of acts of mail and wire fraud.
By naming Imrex as a defendant but not as an enterprise, Sedima
avoided implicating the distinction question. Nearly all courts con-
sidering the question have concluded that, as a matter of law, the sec-
tion 1962(c) enterprise must be distinct from the defendant. These
courts conclude that section 1962(c) "clearly envisions two entities" 5
because a person cannot be "employed by or associated with" itself.8 6
85. Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1058 (1986).
86. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987); Atkinson v.
Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 3276 (1987); Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1986); Schofield v.
First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1986); Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751
F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d
388, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Rae v.
Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689
F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d
1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 710 F.2d
1361, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); NL Indus., Inc. v. Gulf& Western Indus., Inc., 650
F. Supp. 1115, 1128 (D. Kan. 1986); Garbade v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 645 F.
Supp. 808, 811 (D. Colo. 1986); Zahra v. Charles, 639 F. Supp. 1405, 1407 (E.D. Mich. 1986);
Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1306-07 (D. Colo. 1984); but see United States v.
Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir.) ("A corporation may be simultaneously both a
defendant and the enterprise" under section 1962(c)), reh'g denied, 688 F.2d 852 (1 1th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
In jurisdictions that require allegation of a section 1962(c) enterprise distinct from the
defendant, civil RICO plaintiffs might achieve some measure of flexibility by careful pleading.
For example, potential defendants frequently hold an employer-employee relationship, with
the employer the party better able to satisfy a judgment. The plaintiff might name the
employer as the enterprise, name the employee as the defendant, and seek to hold the employer
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Most courts reaching the question under
section 1962(c), however, have concluded that the doctrine does not apply to allegations of
violation of that section. See, e.g., Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987);
Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1986) (Because Congress in
section 1962(c) "intended to separate the enterprise from the criminal 'person' or 'persons,' "
held "inappropriate... to use respondeat superior to accomplish indirectly what.., the statute
directly denies."); Brent Liquid Transport, Inc. v. GATX Leasing Corp., 650 F. Supp. 467,
475 (N.D. Miss. 1986) ("The rule that the [section 1962(c)] defendant must be separate and
distinct from the enterprise cannot be circumvented by imposing vicarious liability ... under
the doctrine of respondeat superior."); Gilbert v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107,
109 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (To apply doctrine of respondeat superior in section 1962(c) actions
"would be to read the enterprise requirement out of the statute entirely, whenever a corporate
defendant is involved."); Continental Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 439-40
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Defendant "cannot rely on theories of respondeat superior to accomplish an end-run around
[the] required distinction between person and enterprise under [section 1962(c)]."); Northern
Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 835 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Dakis v.
Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,
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(d) Section 1962(d)
The plaintiff Sedima also alleged that the three defendants had con-
spired to violate section 1962(c). The conspiracy count was grounded
in section 1962(d), 7 which makes it unlawful for any person "to con-
spire to violate any of the provisions" of the section's first three sub-
sections. The section 1962(d) offense arises from an agreement to
violate one or more of these three subsections.88
2. Must the Enterprise Be Distinct From the Pattern of
Racketeering Activity?
The circuits remain divided on yet another distinction question.
Must a RICO plaintiff, as a matter of law, allege the existence of an
enterprise that is distinct from the conduct that would establish the
alleged pattern of racketeering activity? 9 While specifying that the
"enterprise" and the "pattern" remain separate elements of a RICO
548 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 & n.9 (N.D. I11. 1982). Contra, Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811
(D. Md. 1985); Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083-84 (D. Del. 1984)
("[N]othing in RICO or its legislative history ... would suggest that the normal rules of
agency law should not apply" to civil RICO claims; application of doctrine of respondeat
superior "will, at least, in most instances, further the statutory goals.").
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982), quoted in relevant part supra note 53.
88. The circuits remain divided on a fundamental question: what is the nature of the
agreement that must be shown in the establishment of a defendant's violation of section
1962(d)? The First and Second Circuits have held that section 1962(d) requires proof that the
defendant personally agreed to commit two or more predicate acts of racketeering activity.
See, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Rabito
v. United States, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983). Most circuits reaching this question, however,
require only proof of a defendant's agreement that other members of the conspiracy violate
RICO through the commission of two or more predicate acts. See, e.g., United States v.
Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 494-500 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 422 (1986); United States
v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d
615, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514,
1529 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub not. Morris v. United States, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
89. For discussion of the pattern element, see infra notes 107-49 and accompanying text.
This latter distinction question ordinarily arises, if at all, in actions alleging association-in-fact
enterprises. Because these enterprises are not pre-existing legal entities, they frequently consist
primarily or entirely of the associates' predicate acts that are alleged to constitute the pattern.
In Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986), however, the plaintiff alleged that
the enterprise was the partnership entered into by the three individual defendants. First the
court of appeals vacated the jury's civil RICO award on the ground that the plaintiff had not
proved a pattern of racketeering activity at all. Id. at 257. Then, because the partnership
"'appear[ed] to have had no purpose distinct from the conduct inherent in [defendants']
conversion scheme," the panel in dictum "express[ed] doubt" whether the plaintiff had proved
an enterprise distinct from any alleged pattern. Id. at 258.
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claim, United States v. Turkette9° left room for division on this vexing
question. Writing for the Court in that decision, which concerned an
association-in-fact enterprise, Justice Byron R. White stated:
The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of
persons associated together for a common purpose of engag-
ing in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering
activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as
defined by the statute.... The former is proved by evidence
of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evi-
dence that the various associates function as a continuing
unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite
number of acts of racketeering committed by the partici-
pants in the enterprise. While the proof used to establish
these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce,
proof of one does not necessarily establish the other. The
"enterprise" is not the "pattern of racketeering activity"; it
is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times
remains a separate element which must be proved by the
Government. 91
The Eighth Circuit has held that the alleged RICO enterprise must,
as a matter of law, be distinct from the pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. In United States v. Bledsoe,9 2 the court stressed Turkette's
description of a RICO enterprise as "at all times ... a separate ele-
ment" '93 that is "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization...
[whose] various associates function as a continuing unit." 94 Bledsoe
concluded that Turkette had defined "three basic characteristics." 95
According to Bledsoe, a RICO enterprise, including an association-in-
fact enterprise, must have not only "a common or shared purpose
which animates those associated with it"96 and "some continuity of
both structure and personality"; 97 the enterprise must also have "an
'ascertainable structure' distinct from that inherent in the conduct of
90. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
91. Id. at 583 (citation and footnote omitted).
92. 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Phillips v. United States, 459 U.S. 1040
(1982).
93. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 664 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
94. Id. at 665 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
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a pattern of racketeering activity." The Bledsoe panel concluded
that consistent with Turkette, a RICO enterprise must have an exist-
ence, and must conduct activity, apart from the existence and activity
that is alleged to constitute the pattern. Specifically, the panel
declared that the enterprise
cannot simply be the undertaking of the acts of racketeer-
ing[;] neither can it be the minimal association which sur-
rounds these acts. Any two criminal acts will necessarily be
surrounded by some degree of organization and no two indi-
viduals will ever jointly perpetrate a crime without some
degree of association apart from the commission of the
crime itself. Thus unless the inclusion of the enterprise ele-
ment requires proof of some structure separate from the
racketeering activity and distinct from the organization
which is a necessary incident to the racketeering, [RICO]
simply punishes the commission of two of the specified
crimes within a 10-year period.99
Five months after Bledsoe, the Eighth Circuit applied that deci-
sion's enterprise concept in a civil RICO action. In Bennett v. Berg,1° °
the plaintiffs were current and former residents of John Knox Village,
a retirement community organized as a not-for-profit corporation.
The civil RICO counts alleged that through numerous acts of mail
fraud, various individual defendants had violated each of section
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)). The Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits have reached virtually the
same conclusion concerning Turkette's definition of enterprise. In the Third Circuit, for
example, a civil RICO plaintiff must prove
1) that the enterprise is an ongoing organization with some sort of framework
or superstructure for making or carrying out decisions; 2) that the members of
the enterprise function as a continuing unit with established duties; and finally
3) that the enterprise must be separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages.
Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 789-90 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985) (following United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214,
221-24 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ciancaglini v. United States, 464 U.S. 849 (1983)). See
also, e.g., Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 441, 442 (5th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (holding that plaintiffs failed to establish that defendant bank, its holding company,
and three bank employees were associated in any manner apart from the bank's activities),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3276 (1987); United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1985) (in
affirming RICO conviction, court stated that the enterprise satisfied tests enunciated in Bledsoe
and Riccobene).
99. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 664.
100. 684 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds and aff'd in part
en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
1987]
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1962's four subsections by engaging in financial mismanagement and
self-dealing that left the community on the verge of bankruptcy. The
Bennett panel concluded that the corporation was a proper civil
RICO enterprise because it demonstrated not only a common purpose
and continuity, but also "an ascertainable structure apart from any
predicate acts of mail fraud." ' If the alleged predicate acts were
removed, the corporation as a legal entity would continue
"provid[ing] numerous legitimate services." 102
The Second Circuit has expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit's view
that the evidence offered to prove the RICO enterprise must, as a
matter of law, be distinct from the evidence offered to prove the pat-
tern of racketeering activity. The Second Circuit has instead "upheld
application of RICO to situations where the enterprise was, in effect,
no more than the sum of the predicate racketeering acts."' 03 In Moss
v. Morgan Stanley Inc., °' plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of
himself and other investors who sold stock in Deseret Pharmaceutical
Company ("Deseret") on November 30, 1976. The civil RICO claim
alleged that defendant Courtois, employed by Morgan Stanley Inc. in
its mergers and acquisitions department, obtained confidential infor-
mation that day of an imminent tender offer for Deseret stock. Cour-
tois informed the defendant Antoniu, a Kuhn Loeb & Co. employee,
who in turn informed the defendant Newman. Pursuant to an agree-
ment with Courtois and Antoniu, stockbroker Newman that day
purchased Deseret stock for his and their accounts. Upon public
announcement of the tender offer a few days later, the three defend-
ants tendered their Deseret shares and reaped substantial profits.
Plaintiff Moss alleged that through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity consisting of predicate acts of fraud in the sale of securities, New-
man violated section 1962(c) in his purchase and sale of Deseret stock
based on the confidential information. Stressing Turkette's determi-
nation that the proof used to establish the RICO pattern "may in
particular cases coalesce"'0 5 with the proof offered to establish the
101. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983),
quoted in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.
Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
104. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984). See also, e.g., Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983);
United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.) (expressly rejecting Eighth Circuit view), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
105. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1982).
[Vol. 12
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enterprise, the Second Circuit concluded that Moss had adequately
pleaded the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise consisting of
the activities of the three individual defendants. Unlike the corporate
legal entity that served as the alleged Bennett enterprise, the alleged
Moss enterprise did not conduct activity apart from the predicate acts
of its associates. °6
C. Section 1961: The Pattern of Racketeering Activity
1. Racketeering Activity
Each of section 1962's enumerated enterprise relationships requires
proof that the defendant engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." According to section 1961(1),1 07 a person engages in "racketeer-
106. For other decisions rejecting the view that the RICO enterprise must, as a matter of
law, be distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity, see, e.g., United States v. Qaoud, 777
F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Although 'enterprise' and 'pattern of racketeering activity'
are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence."), cert. denied sub nom.
Callanan v. United States, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522,
1537 & n.13 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697
F.2d 915, 921 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading
Co., 659 F. Supp. 1249, 1251-52 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides that
"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene
matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section
659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section
659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section
1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341
(relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465
(relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice),
section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511
(relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512
(relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513
(relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952
(relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund
payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling
businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments),
section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived
from specified unlawful activity), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to
interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to trafficking
in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to
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ing activity" by engaging in any act "chargeable" under several
generically described state criminal laws, any act "indictable" under
several specific federal criminal provisions, or any "offense" involving
bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related activities that is "pun-
ishable" under federal law. Certain of these so-called predicate acts
(for example, "any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, .. . [or]
arson, which is chargeable under State law ...... ") might well be
committed by persons generally labeled "racketeers." Other defend-
ants, however, frequently commit at least three other predicate acts-
any "indictable" act of mail or wire fraud, and "any offense involving
... fraud in the sale of securities... ."lo As the Supreme Court noted
trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424 (relating to white slave
traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code,
section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor
organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds),
(D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the
sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving,
concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act
which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B),(D) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Supreme Court recently
diminished the Government's ability to bring RICO prosecutions based on predicate acts of
mail or wire fraud. In McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), the Court reversed a
public official's mail fraud conviction. The Court held that the federal mail fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), protects only money or property rights and not the citizenry's intangible
right to good government. The same holding would seemingly obtain under the federal wire
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), which contains language identical to the language that
McNally found dispositive. Both statutes operate against "any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises . . . ." See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 n.6 (1987) ("The mail
and wire fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the
same analysis to both sets of offenses here."). Carpenter specified that McNally "did not limit
the scope of § 1341 to tangible as distinguished from intangible property rights," Id. at 320,
but merely distinguished protected property rights from unprotected intangible rights such as
the right to good government. Id. at 320-21.
McNally and Carpenter will have little effect on the typical civil RICO action based on
predicate acts of mail or wire fraud. Section 1964(c) requires that civil RICO plaintiffs allege
injury in their "business or property"; see supra text accompanying note 33. McNally and
Carpenter indicate that where a civil RICO plaintiff alleges injury to its business or property by
reason of a section 1962 violation based on predicate acts of mail fraud (and presumably wire
fraud), the plaintiff must allege pecuniary injury or injury to tangible or intangible property
rights; allegation of injury to an unprotected intangible right does not suffice. Even before
McNally, however, nearly all civil RICO claims based on these predicate acts have alleged
pecuniary injury or injury to tangible or intangible property rights, even when the defendant
was an allegedly corrupt public official or political party. See, e.g., Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d
223, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1987) (county sheriff); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 704, 713 (2d
Cir.) (political party), cert. denied sub noma. Nassau County Republican Comm. v. Cullen, 107
S. Ct. 3266 (1987); State of N.Y. v. O'Hara, 652 F. Supp. 1049, 1051-52 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (city
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in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs. ," "the large major-
ity of civil RICO complaints use mail fraud, wire fraud or securities
fraud as the required predicate offenses." ' 10
Sedima held that section 1961(1) does not limit civil RICO's
defendant class to persons previously convicted under RICO or its
predicate acts."' The prior-conviction limit, which had divided the
lower courts,112 would have relegated civil RICO to virtual insignifi-
cance because federal and state authorities prosecute only a small per-
centage of persons who otherwise would be subject to civil RICO
liability. Because Congress defined predicate acts that are "charge-
able, .... indictable" or "punishable," Sedima held that "racketeering
activity consists not of acts for which the defendant has been con-
victed, but of acts for which he could be.""13
By rejecting the prior-conviction limit, Sedima focused greater
attention on civil RICO's standard of proof. May a plaintiff prove all
elements of a civil RICO claim (including the defendant's commission
of predicate acts) by a preponderance of the evidence, or must proof
of the predicate acts' commission be made by a higher standard?
RICO does not state civil RICO's standard of proof. Because the
predicate acts are defined by reference to criminal statutes and
because the acts' commission may result in treble-damage recovery,
arguments had been made in favor of requiring proof of the acts' com-
mission by a higher standard.' ' Sedima expressly declined to deter-
manager). But see, e.g., Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, 656 F. Supp. 555, 557 (N.D. I11.
1987) (civil RICO plaintiffs alleged that through predicate acts of mail and wire fraud,
defendants engaged in a scheme "to defraud the public of its right to the honest
administration" of the City Colleges' affairs; court dismissed the civil RICO claims before
McNally without discussing whether plaintiffs had properly alleged commission of the
predicate acts by alleging injury to an intangible right).
109. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987), discussed
supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 2763. From its study of the 270 pre-1985 district court civil RICO decisions, the
American Bar Association Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force concluded:
Approximately 44 percent of the cases for which the predicate offenses can be
determined from the opinion appear to rely solely on allegations of mail or wire
fraud. Another 13 percent rely primarily on mail or wire fraud, but also allege
another predicate offense. Twelve percent focus on another predicate offense,
but also allege mail or wire fraud violations. Approximately 35 percent rely
solely or primarily on allegations of securities fraud. No other predicate offense
occurs in as many as two percent of the cases.
See ABA Report, supra note 12, at 57.
111. 473 U.S. at 488-93.
112. See Abrams, supra note 10, at 1519-24.
113. 473 U.S. at 488.
114. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1984)
19871
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mine the predicate acts' standard of proof, but dicta in the Court's
opinion appeared to approve "the usual preponderance standard."'15
In decisions considering civil RICO's standard of proof since Sedima,
lower courts have uniformly applied the preponderance standard to
all elements of the claim. 1 6
2. "Pattern" of Racketeering Activity
"[T]he heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of apattern of
racketeering." '" ' According to section 1961(5), a pattern "requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
[October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity."1 I 8
(suggesting that commission of the predicate acts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt),
rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Matz, Determining the Standard of Proof in Lawsuits Brought
Under RICO, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 21, col. 1 (arguing that commission of the predicate
acts must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
115. 473 U.S. at 491. Writing for the Court in Sedima, Justice White had this to say
concerning the standard of proof question:
In a number of settings, conduct that can be punished as criminal only upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt will support civil sanctions under a
preponderance standard .... There is no indication that Congress sought to
depart from this general principle here . . . . That the offending conduct is
described by reference to criminal statutes does not mean that its occurrence
must be established by criminal standards or that the consequences of a finding
of liability in a private civil action are identical to the consequences of a criminal
conviction ....
Id. (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390
(1983) (holding that persons seeking recovery under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 need prove their cause of action only by "the preponderance-of-the-evidence stan-
dard generally applicable in civil actions"). For a discussion of the factors courts consider in
determining the standard of proof under a statute that does not establish a standard, see, e.g.,
Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 389-90.
116. See, e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1987); Cullen
v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nassau County Republican
Comm. v. Cullen, 107 S. Ct. 3266 (1987); Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co.,
782 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1986); Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975,
1001 (D. Minn. 1986); Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1309 (W.D. Mich),
aff'd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1986); Bosteve, Ltd. v. Marauszwski, 642 F. Supp. 197, 202 n.7
(E.D.N.Y. 1986); Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 475, 477
(E.D. La. 1986); Stainton v. Tarantino, 736 F. Supp. 1051, 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1986). For pre-
Sedima decisions that approved application of the preponderance standard to all elements of
the civil RICO claim, see, e.g., Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313-
14 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del.
1978).
117. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2766 (1987)
(emphasis by the Court).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
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Most pre-Sedima decisions considering the pattern question con-
cluded or assumed that a defendant's commission of two predicate
acts within the ten-year period was sufficient to establish the pattern
necessary to support RICO liability. In 1983, for example, the plain-
tiffs in Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith "9 alleged that through
multiple acts of mail and wire fraud, the defendants had engaged in a
scheme by which Smith, the chief legal officer responsible for han-
dling medical malpractice and personal injury claims against certain
nonprofit institutions, sold confidential information about these
claims to various attorneys. The attorneys used this information in
representing claimants in litigation against the institutions.
Smith and other defendants moved to dismiss the civil RICO claim
on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. According to the movants, the alleged acts of mail and
wire fraud arose out of "a common nucleus of facts" and thus "com-
prise[d] only one predicate act."' 2 ° The court denied the motion on
the ground that the plaintiffs had "adequately allege[d] the two predi-
cate RICO acts required to establish" a pattern.' 2 '
Decisions such as Smith suggested few barriers to civil RICO liabil-
ity. Under settled law, each fraudulent use of the mails or wires con-
stitutes a separate indictable offense of mail or wire fraud, even if
multiple uses are made pursuant to a single fraudulent scheme. 22 By
basing civil RICO claims on predicate acts of mail or wire fraud,
therefore, plaintiffs could allege a pattern of racketeering activity
almost on the mere allegation of intentional fraud. After all, "[in
today's integrated interstate economy, it is the rare transaction that
does not somehow rely on extensive use of the mails or the
119. 576 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). For other pre-Sedima decisions concluding or
assuming that commission of two predicate acts was sufficient to establish a RICO pattern, see,
e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.
Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 677-78
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595,
602 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 442 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Furman v. Cirrito, 578 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other
grounds, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 473 U.S.
922 (1985), on remand, 782 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1986). See also, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v.
Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 410 & n.3, 414 (8th Cir. 1984) (dictum), vacated and
remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985), on remand, 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1058 (1986).
120. Smith, 576 F. Supp. at 1065.
121. Id. at 1066.
122. See, e.g., Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916); United States v.
Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982).
1987]
HeinOnline  -- 12 Tul. Mar. L.J.  45 1987
TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL
telephone."123
Sedima made the pattern element civil RICO's newest major battle-
ground. After rejecting limits that some decisions had placed on civil
RICO's litigant classes, the Supreme Court stated that civil RICO's
apparent breadth stemmed partly from the "failure of Congress and
the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' ,,124 In foot-
note fourteen, the Court stressed that "the definition of a 'pattern of
racketeering activity' differs from the other provisions in section 1961
in that it states that a pattern 'requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity,' not that it 'means' two such acts." 125 According to the
Court:
[t]he implication is that while two acts are necessary, they
may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of
anything do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative
history supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeer-
ing activity do not constitute a pattern . . . . "The infiltra-
tion of legitimate business normally requires more than one
'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity
to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship
which combines to produce a pattern."' 126
In the three years since Sedima, several circuits have wrestled with
the pattern element in light of the Court's provocative footnote.
"Relationship," the footnote's second prong, usually is not a matter of
serious dispute because civil RICO plaintiffs ordinarily allege predi-
cate acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, or methods
of commission. 21 "Continuity," however, has divided the circuits.
123. Eastern Corp. Fed. Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532,
1535 (D. Mass. 1986).
124. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
125. Id. at 496 n.14 (emphasis by the Court); section 1961(5) is quoted supra text
accompanying note 118.
126. Id. (quoting Senate Report, supra note 9, at 158) (emphasis by the Court). See also 473
U.S. at 527 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The definition of 'pattern' may ... logically be interpreted
as meaning that the presence of the predicate acts is only the beginning: something more is
required for a 'pattern' to be proved."). After rejecting the limits the Second Circuit had
placed on civil RICO's litigant classes, the Court remanded Sedima for determination whether
the defendants had committed the requisite predicate acts and, if so, whether those acts
constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 500.
127. See, e.g., International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1987)
("[T]he element of relationship between the predicate acts is undoubtably present, but the
element of continuity is absent."); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir.
1987) ("clear" that alleged predicate acts satisfied relationship prong); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v.
Serv-Wel Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (brief discussion finding
relationship prong satisfied); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986)
[Vol. 12
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The Eighth Circuit's "multiple scheme" test and the Second Circuit's
"continuing enterprise" test highlight the polar extremes, while the
Seventh Circuit has moved toward a middle-ground "separate trans-
action" test.
To allege continuity in the Eighth Circuit, a civil RICO plaintiff
must assert a defendant's engagement in more than one "scheme."12'
In Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,29 for example, the
civil RICO count alleged that the defendant securities brokers made
fraudulent misrepresentations to secure the plaintiff's account and
then churned the account for six years by recommending transactions
unsuitable to the plaintiff's investment needs. The court of appeals
assumed that the plaintiff could establish the defendant's commission
of several related predicate acts in connection with the account. 3 °
The panel held, however, that these acts constituted only one ongoing
scheme, even though the acts allegedly continued for a considerable
(Defendant "clearly has proved the 'relationship' prong."); Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat'l
Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454, 1472 (D. N.J. 1986) (finding alleged predicate acts "clearly related");
but see, e.g., Rojas v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 613 F. Supp. 968, 971 n.l (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(summary judgment dismissing civil RICO claim entered against plaintiff who alleged
unrelated predicate acts; "[s]everal isolated acts . . . do not a pattern make").
128. See, e.g., Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164 & n.l (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(noting Second Circuit's rejection of multiple-scheme test in Ianniello, infra notes 134-39 and
accompanying text, but adhering to that test); Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 209-10
(8th Cir. 1986) (one scheme to draw down three letters of credit does not constitute RICO
pattern), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953 (1987); Superior Oil Co., 785 F.2d at 254-57 (civil RICO
award vacated because plaintiff alleged only "one continuing scheme to convert gas from
Superior Oil's pipeline," without proof that defendants "had ever done these activities in the
past ... [or] that they were engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere").
Other decisions concluding that continuity requires allegation of more than one scheme
include Manax v. McNamara, No. W-87-CA-D14 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Madara v. Singular Music Publishing Co., No. 84-0006 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Meade v. Weber, No. 85-4722 (E.D. La. Apr. 23,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Bank & Trust Co. v. Solomon, Comer & Lissansky,
No. 86-7158 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file); McMurtry v.
Brasfield, 654 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (E.D. Va. 1987) (motion to dismiss civil RICO claim
granted because plaintiffs alleged a single scheme that had "only one purpose ..., one result,
and one group of victims"; plaintiffs failed to allege "an ongoing enterprise that poses a
continuing threat to victims harmed in a similar manner"); Meyer v. Cloud County Bank &
Trust, 647 F. Supp. 974, 975 (D. Kan. 1986) ("[C]ontinuity... presumes repeated activity, not
merely repeated acts to carry out the same scheme."); Garbade v. Great Divide Mining &
Milling Corp., 645 F. Supp. 808, 815 (D. Colo. 1986); Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 297, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (civil
RICO claim dismissed for failure to establish defendant's engagement in "any other past or
present criminal activities"); Zahra v. Charles, 639 F. Supp. 1405, 1408-09 (E.D. Mich. 1986);
Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 578 (D. Utah 1986); Professional Assets Man-
agement, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 616 F. Supp. 1418, 1420-23 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
129. 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986).
130. Id. at 329.
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period. Absent an allegation that the defendants "had engaged in
similar endeavors in the past or that they were engaged in other crimi-
nal activities,"' 31 the plaintiff failed to allege "a true 'pattern' of
related but distinct schemes of fraud."' 3 2 According to the panel "[iut
places a real strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent
effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern of racke-
teering activity.' "I"
In United States v. Ianniello,"' the Second Circuit affirmed the
defendants' RICO convictions arising from their conduct of an enter-
prise that skimmed profits from bars and restaurants owned and oper-
ated by the defendants. The defendants' activities defrauded the state
liquor authority, state taxation authorities, and legitimate creditors.
Apparently relying at least partly on Eighth Circuit precedent, one
defendant contended that his conviction was based on two predicate
acts of mail fraud that constituted a "single, discrete crime"'35 which,
as a matter of law, could not constitute a RICO pattern.
The Ianniello panel, however, expressly rejected the Eighth Cir-
cuit's multiple-scheme test as resulting from "a strained and inappro-
priate reading of the statutory language" '36 whose application would
"effectively eliminate" the pattern requirement.' 37 Ianniello held that
when a RICO defendant commits at least two predicate acts within
ten years that have the common purpose of furthering a continuing
criminal enterprise with which the defendant is associated, this com-
mission establishes both relationship and continuity. 3 8  In a subse-
quent civil RICO action, another Second Circuit panel stated in
dictum that "Ianniello confirms that two related predicate acts will
suffice to establish a pattern."' 139
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Superior Oil Co., 785 F.2d at 257); accord, Holmberg, 800 F.2d at 210.
134. 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986).
135. lanniello, 808 F.2d at 191.
136. Id. at 192.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987). Prior
to Beck the Circuit's district courts had been divided concerning the question whether
Ianniello's holding applies in civil RICO actions. Compare, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Big
Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (lanniello holding limited
to cases involving "wholly criminal" enterprises) with City of N.Y. v. Joseph L. Balkan, Inc.,
656 F. Supp. 536, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying lanniello holding in civil RICO action), and
State of N.Y. v. O'Hara, 652 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (same). Beck's affirmative
answer to the question is consistent with the fact that RICO's criminal and civil remedies are
each based on the defendant's violation of section 1962, with no suggestion in RICO that the
[Vol. 12
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No other circuit has adopted either the Eighth Circuit's multiple-
scheme test or the Second Circuit's continuing-enterprise test. On the
one hand, the multiple-scheme test has been criticized for inviting
results that are inconsistent with congressional intent that RICO
impose enhanced sanctions on persons who regularly commit predi-
cate acts of racketeering. "[D]efendants who commit a large and
ongoing scheme, albeit a single scheme, would automatically escape
RICO liability for their acts."'"
On the other hand, the continuing-enterprise test has been criti-
cized as inconsistent with congressional intent that RICO implicate
not "the isolated offender," but rather only the person who "regularly
commits" predicate acts. 4 ' Without citing Ianniello, the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded that the test "would ... eliminate the pattern require-
ment altogether."1 42 Because commission of fraud invariably requires
use of the mails or wires at least twice within ten years, "every fraud
would constitute 'a pattern of racketeering activity.' ",143
The Seventh Circuit's middle-ground "separate transaction" test
requires an allegation of less than multiple schemes but more than
minimal acts and a continuing enterprise. In Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan,144 for example, the civil RICO claim alleged that the
defendants had defrauded the plaintiff investors through several acts
of mail fraud for nearly four years. Some acts of mail fraud con-
cerned two separate foreclosure sales, and others concerned allegedly
fraudulent statements made in connection with an initial loan transac-
tion. The panel viewed the alleged predicate acts as "part of a single
section's meaning varies according to the nature of the plaintiff. Cf Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2344 (1987) ("[Tlhe makings of a 'pattern of racketeering'
are not yet clear, but the fact remains that a 'pattern' for civil purposes is a 'pattern' for
criminal purposes.") (quoting Page v. Mosley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806
F.2d 291, 299 n.13 (1st Cir. 1986)).
140. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986), quoted in Roeder v.
Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803
F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (Multiple-scheme test "would allow a large continuous scheme
to escape the enhanced penalties of RICO liability."), quoted in International Data Bank, Ltd.
v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987); Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659 F.
Supp. 1249, 1255 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[I]t would be counterproductive if one massive
racketeering scheme could not be attacked under RICO whereas several insignificant schemes
could.").
141. Lipin Enters, Inc., 803 F.2d at 324 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 496 n.14 (1985)).
142. International Data Bank, Ltd., 812 F.2d at 155.
143. Id. at 154.
144. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
19871
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grand scheme,"' 45  but held that the acts established continuity
because they were "ongoing over an identified period of time"' 46 and
thus could "fairly be viewed as constituting . . . 'transactions "some-
what separated in time and place." ' ."
As the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit formulations demon-
strate, no consensus has yet emerged concerning the showing a civil
RICO plaintiff must make in order to allege continuity sufficient to
establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 4 ' Some circuits determine
continuity without applying an enunciated test.' 49  The nationwide
145. Id. at 976.
146. Id. at 975.
147. Id. (citations omitted). According to the panel, factors relevant in determining
separateness include:
the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they
were committed, the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and
the occurrence of distinct injuries. However, the mere fact that the predicate
acts relate to the same overall scheme or involve the same victim does not mean
that the acts automatically fail to satisfy the pattern requirement.
Id. at 975-76. See also Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 1987)
(separateness not established by allegation of fraudulent representations leading to a single
contract and the transfer of a single business opportunity); Marks v. Pannell Kerr Forster, 811
F.2d 1108, 1111 (7th Cir. 1987) (separateness not established by allegation of several predicate
acts to defraud one victim on one occasion); Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347,
349-50 (7th Cir. 1986) (separateness not established by allegation of several acts of mail fraud
over period of several years to defraud plaintiffs on one claim on one insurance policy); Lipin
Enters., Inc., 803 F.2d at 323 (pattern not established by allegation of at least twelve acts of
mail fraud during several months in connection with purchase and sale of one business); but
see Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985) (without citing
Sedima, held that pattern established by allegation that defendant filed nine fraudulent tax
returns over nine-month period in connection with a single business).
For decisions in other circuits that determine continuity by applying similar middle-ground
approaches based on separateness, see, e.g., McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., No. 83-
1340 (D. N.J. July 31, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Penturelli v. Spector Cohen
Gadon & Rosen, 640 F. Supp. 868, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Eastern Corporate Federal Credit
Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532, 1534-36 (D. Mass. 1986);
Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454, 1472 (D. N.J. 1986) (pattern ade-
quately alleged because "acts took place over a period of almost six years, took place all over
the country and injured approximately 1400 individual investors"); Paul S. Mullin & Assocs.
v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986); Kredietbank, N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., CA
84-1903 (D. N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Allington v. Carpenter, 619
F. Supp. 474, 478 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
148. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2344 (1987)
("[T]he makings of a 'pattern of racketeering' are not yet clear. ... ) (quoting Page v.
Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 299 n.13 (1st Cir. 1986)).
149. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[N]o one
characteristic can be considered as controlling in determining whether a pattern exists.");
International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[N]o mechanical
test can determine the existence of a RICO pattern .... What constitutes a RICO pattern is
... a matter of criminal dimension and degree.").
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division suggests that uniformity may have to await Supreme Court
determination of the issues raised but not addressed or answered in
Sedima's footnote fourteen. 50
III. CONCLUSION
Current judicial trends indicate that the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act will assume a predominant role in private
maritime litigation sounding in fraud. Contrary to the vision of mob-
ster defendants that RICO's name may evoke, the Act's private cause
of action has barely touched mobsters. A private plaintiff states a
treble-damage RICO claim by alleging that it suffered injury in its
business or property because the defendant, while involved in one or
more enumerated relationships with an enterprise, engaged in a pat-
tern of racketeering activity. The pattern may consist of acts of mail
fraud, wire fraud, or fraud in the sale of securities. Because nonrack-
eteer defendants frequently commit these acts, civil RICO shows signs
of becoming a broad federal antifraud remedy that "revolutionizes
private litigation."' 51
150. The Court recently granted certiorari in a case that is likely to permit significant
amplification of Sedima's footnote fourteen and the civil RICO pattern element. See H.J. Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W.
3638 (Mar. 22, 1988).
151. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1987]
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